Introduction
argue that family founders have a long-term view of their firm and have a strong interest in its continuity and survival. In support of this argument, there are many examples of successful and well-known family firms that have stood the test of time and have survived for generations. Such firms include Ford Motor Company, BMW, l'Oréal and Siemens.
Conversely, myopia and short-termism are traits frequently associated with widely held firms (see e.g. Franks and Mayer, 1997) .
However, family firms face a major challenge when it is time to 'pass on the baton' as the retiring family CEOs often appoint their offspring as successors (Plath, 2008) . More specifically, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) argue that the firm's family founders may be subject to 'dynastic thinking', resulting in the top management jobs being filled with their relatives rather than more talented nonfamily managers (Barnett, 1960) . Although family members are often not the best candidates for the job, as they may lack proper education and professionalism, they typically have an unfair advantage over outsiders in getting the top jobs in the firm (Schulze et al., 2001) .
Nonfamily, i.e. minority shareholders' preference for better qualified, nonfamily CEOs may thus clash with the family's desire to extract private benefits of control from their firm.
The literature refers to this conflict of interests as minority shareholder expropriation (see e.g., Maher and Andersson, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2008) . This paper attempts to identify the factors that determine the choice of CEO successor in family firms, thereby also identifying the conditions under which the large shareholder's interests may override the interests of the minority shareholders. More specifically, this paper studies this choice in listed family firms in France, Germany and the UK.
Why study these three countries? First, France, Germany and the UK are representatives of the three main legal families (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , i.e. French civil law, German civil law and common law, respectively. While investor protection is strong under common law, the law of the UK, it is much weaker under French and German civil law. Second, all three countries have distinct corporate governance systems. In France and Germany, corporate control is highly concentrated whereas in the UK it is dispersed. There is also often a wedge between the control and ownership held by the large shareholder in France and Germany whereas this is not the case in the UK. Further, there are also major differences between France and Germany. In particular, France's corporate governance system has traditionally been characterized by the existence of a 'noyau dur', a system of cross-shareholdings between large quoted companies, some of which are former state-owned banks and insurance companies, that was set up to reduce the influence of foreign ownership on French business (see e.g. Bloch and Kemp, 2001) . As a result, and contrary to common wisdom, France is the only country in Europe with substantial equity ownership by banks (15.5% on average of the equity). While Germany is often considered to be a bank-based corporate governance system, ownership by banks is much lower and their influence is typically derived from proxy voting, i.e. from voting the shares of their depositors, in otherwise widely held companies. The three countries also differ in terms of their corporate boards. While the UK has a single-tier board where the executives, including the CEO, and the non-executives sit, Germany has a two-tier board with a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) where the non-executives and employee representatives sit and a management board (Vorstand) where the executives sit.
While France gives its firms the choice between a single-tier board and a two-tier board, most firms have opted for the former (Goergen et al., 2006) . Hence, we also analyze whether the three countries show differences in the impact of the hypothesized determinants on the CEO successor choice. Our empirical analysis suggests that there are cross-country differences. This paper makes three major contributions to the literature. First, existing studies on CEO successions tend to focus on widely held firms, which by definition do not have large shareholders, or unlisted family businesses, which typically have no minority shareholders. In contrast, this paper focuses on listed family firms that have both large and small shareholders and may therefore be subject to minority shareholder expropriation, which may manifest itself via the choice of CEO successor. Second and as stated above, this paper studies three very different corporate governance systems. Hence, it provides insights into the determinants of CEO succession decisions across substantially different institutional settings. Third, this paper makes a colossal effort to assess whether so called independent directors are de facto independent of the family shareholder. Our results suggest that it is important to measure board independence properly as our measure of board independence reduces the likelihood of a family member succeeding the CEO whereas conventionally defined board independence has no such effect.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the sample selection process, the variables and the methodology. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4 while Section 5 focuses on robustness checks. This is followed by conclusions and policy implications.
The determinants of the CEO successor choice
Despite the prevalence of family firms in most countries, research has as yet not extensively investigated the impact of family control and ownership on corporate decision making. On the one hand, some theoretical models predict that strong control, including family control, is likely to mitigate the principal-agent problem, thereby creating shareholder value (see e.g. Admati et al. 1994; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . There is empirical evidence on the USA and Germany that family control and ownership generates shareholder value. Anderson and Reeb (2003) report that US family firms in the S&P 500 outperform nonfamily firms. Similarly, Andres (2008) finds that German family firms have superior performance. Conversely, Faccio et al. (2001) find that family firms in East Asia expropriate their minority shareholders via dividends that are too low. On the other hand, Burkart et al.'s (1997) model predicts that, while large shareholder monitoring may be beneficial, the large shareholder may interfere too much with the way the firm is managed, thereby severely reducing executive discretion and destroying firm value. Further, the large shareholder may extract private benefits of control rather than maximize shareholder value.
More generally, the view that strong family ties may impede shareholder value and economic development is not new. Already Weber (1904) argued that strong predictable family values may constrain the development of economic activities, which require more individualistic forms of entrepreneurship and the absence of nepotism. Similarly, Fukuyama (1995) argues that countries whose businesses are dominated by strong family or blood ties, i.e. 'familism', may suffer from reduced economic growth as such ties put limits on the size of firms and the industrial sectors firms operate in.
We posit that there are five determinants of the choice of the CEO successor: family power, family generation, directors' independence, shareholder protection, and past firm performance.
These five determinants are discussed in detail below.
Family power
There are two broad theses on family control: 'competitive advantage' or 'security benefits of control' and 'private benefits of control ' (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Villalonga and Amit, 2010) .
The main difference between the two is the group of shareholders for whom firm value is assumed to be maximized. According to the competitive advantage thesis, value is maximized for all shareholders (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2010) . Grossman and Hart (1980) call this type of value creation via the monitoring the large shareholder performs the security benefits of control. According to the private benefits of control thesis, value is maximized only for the family, who expropriates the nonfamily shareholders (Burkart et al., 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2010) . While the family may create security benefits of control, the private benefits of control it extracts from the firm exceed the latter.
The question arises as to when this is the case. This is likely to be the case when there is a deviation between cash-flow rights and control rights. It is not uncommon for families from all over the world to use mechanisms such as dual-class shares, voting pacts and pyramidal ownership, to enhance their control rights relative to their cash-flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2009 ). These mechanisms have been found to reduce firm value and performance, suggesting that controlling shareholders may misuse their status to expropriate minority shareholders (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2010) . Li et al. (2008) also show that these mechanisms discourage investment by outside shareholders, in particular institutional investors. More generally, Bebchuk et al. (2000) demonstrate that, for a given level of control, the severity of the conflicts of interests between the large and small shareholders rises nonlinearly (at an increasing rate) with a decrease in the fraction of cash-flow claims of the large shareholder.
More specifically, Dittmann and Ulbricht (2008) for Germany (they study dual-class shares) and Boubaker (2007) for France (he studies the use of pyramids) show evidence of the detrimental effect on shareholder value of these control mechanisms.
1 This suggests that the strength of family control influences the choice of the CEO successor. We propose the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The greater the power of the family, the greater is the likelihood that the new CEO will be a member of the controlling family.
Family generation
McConaughy and Phillips (1999) argue that first-generation family managers are entrepreneurs with the technical and business skills necessary for the creation of the business, but that their successors face different challenges in terms of maintaining and enhancing the business and that these tasks are often much better performed by nonfamily managers. Further, Dyer (1988) However, to preserve the family's private benefits of control and to pursue its own financial interests at the expense of nonfamily shareholders, it is likely that a family member will be appointed as the CEO's successor. Further, according to the socio-emotional wealth thesis, the founder generation may also attach emotional wealth to the firm (Berrone et al., 2007) . Hence, when the succession issue arises, the founder CEO may either push for being re-appointed or choose a family member as successor. Nevertheless given the strong emotional ties with the firm, if there is no suitable successor within the family, the founder CEO may prefer to appoint a nonfamily CEO rather than risk the firm's demise.
To sum up, according to the minority expropriation thesis a family CEO is likely to replace the incumbent family CEO. However, according to the socio-emotional wealth thesis the family's choice of CEO successor is unclear. The existing literature, that has considered family generation, when studying the impact of family CEOs on firm value include Morck et al. (1988), Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Pérez-González (2006) , Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Andres (2008) . These studies find that the first generation of the family outperforms other nonfamily firms whereas no such positive effect or a negative effect is found for subsequent generations. Hence, we expect the generation of the controlling family to influence the choice of the CEO successor, particularly, in the first generation. We propose the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: If the incumbent CEO is the founder or of the founder's generation, it is
more likely that the new CEO will be a family member.
Directors' independence
DeMott (2008) argues that directors independent of both management and the dominant family shareholder play an important role within the complex environment of a family firm. She posits that, by acting vigilantly, independent directors guard the firm's assets against legally problematic extractions by the controlling family. This suggests the likely influence of independent directors on the choice of the CEO successor in favor of the nonfamily shareholders. The question arises as to the definition of independence. Becht et al. (2003) define a director as 'independent' if he or she is not otherwise employed by the firm, is not engaged in business with the firm, and is not a family member of the founder or any executive hired by the firm.
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We have identified five empirical studies that come closest to our investigation on independent directors' influence on the CEO successor choice: Dalton and Kesner (1985) , Park and Rozeff (1994) , Borokhovich et al. (1996) , Borokhovich et al. (2006) , and Hillier and McColgan (2009).
However, these studies limit themselves to classing the firm's board members as inside directors (i.e. employees of the firm) and outside directors. Three of these studies -Park and Rozeff (1994); Borokhovich et al. (1996) ; and Hillier and McColgan (2009) -find that outsider dominated boards are more likely to choose a CEO from outside the firm. The latter is the only study on listed family firms in the UK. The other four studies are on listed US firms. We arrive at the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The higher the percentage of directors independent of the controlling family, the greater is the likelihood that the new CEO will not be related to the family.
2 A growing body of empirical research suggests that directors' independence is associated with improved outcomes with respect to some specific types of decisions (e.g. Brickley et al, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997; Del Guercio et al., 2003) . In particular, directors' independence seems to have an impact on CEO turnover (e.g. Borokhovich et al., 1996) , the incidence of fraud (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000) , executive compensation (e.g. Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009), and on the incidence of opportunistic timing of stock option grants (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2010) . However, the definition of independence varies across these studies.
Shareholder protection
The extent of minority expropriation in family firms likely depends on the level of shareholder rights granted by the country where the firm is located. La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 find that the differences in the size and development of capital markets across countries can be explained in part by the differences in investor protection. They argue that investor protection is highest in common law countries, including the USA and the UK, lowest in French civil law countries and somewhere in between in German and Scandinavian civil law countries. However, recent studies postulate that the degree of shareholder protection is determined not only by the corporate law applicable to the firm or by the codes of best corporate governance practice (e.g. legal requirement to comply or explain), but also by the listing requirements of the stock exchange where the firm is listed (Goergen and Renneboog, 2008) . Cross-listing, whereby a firm that is already listed on its home stock exchange obtains a listing abroad, has been suggested as a way for the firm to opt into another, better legal system. Given the more stringent disclosure standards and law in the USA, Coffee (2002) argues that foreign firms may cross-list in the USA to commit themselves to protect their minority shareholders, the so called bonding hypothesis. Those family firms that cross-list in the USA have to follow the generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), to comply with the requirements of the stock exchange, and to comply  at least to some extent  to US securities laws (Reese and Weisbach, 2002) . Cross-listing therefore provides a way whereby foreign firms can subject themselves to higher levels of shareholder protection.
Overall, the literature provides strong support for the bonding hypothesis (see Goergen and Renneboog, 2008 
Past firm performance
According to the rational adaptive view (Dalton and Kesner, 1985) , an external successor to the CEO will be appointed following poor performance and an internal one following good performance. Conversely, Boeker and Goodstein (1993) 
Data and methodology

Sample selection
The sample covers CEO successions in listed family firms in France, Germany and the UK over the ten-year period of 2001-2010. We define a family firm as a firm in which a family owns at least 25% of the votes, and the CEO is a member of this family. In addition, at least one of the following three criteria has to be met: (i) the CEO is the founder or a descendant of the founder;
(ii) the CEO shares their surname with the firm; and/ or (iii) the CEO shares their surname with another member of the firm's board of directors. gives some credence to our argument as minority shareholder protection is higher in the UK. Still, when re-appointments are excluded (see Section 5) our results are upheld.
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE
The succession events are classified into two groups based on the type of successor. The first group comprises family-to-family successions, where the successor is a family member, as well as re-appointments of the incumbent, and the second group comprises family-to-nonfamily successions where the successor is not related to the controlling family. 
Definitions of the variables and models
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which is equal to one, if the new CEO is a member of the controlling family or the incumbent family CEO is re-appointed, and zero if the new CEO is not a family member. The main independent variables are various measures for the five hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor, namely, family power, family generation, directors' independence, minority shareholder protection and past firm performance. These variables are defined below. Given the practical difficulties of measuring directors' independence and the importance of this variable to our analysis, we start with this variable.
Directors' independence (see Hypothesis 3) focuses on the 'independence' of directors vis-à-vis the controlling family. In other words, while on paper some directors may be independent, they may not be so de facto. To assess directors' independence, we check each director against a set of six criteria. Only directors who do not meet any of these criteria are considered to be independent.
The six criteria are as follows: (1) the director is related by blood or marriage to the controlling family; (2) the director has tenure of at least nine years 7 with the firm; (3) the director is an employee or a director of another firm controlled by the same family; (4) the director was appointed to the board by the controlling family; (5) the director sits on other boards together with the family directors; and (6) the director is a former employee of the firm. We exclude employee representatives on German supervisory boards. The reason for this is that de facto these directors are not independent as they represent employee interests and not those of the shareholders. 8 Our measure of board independence is a much more thorough measure of directors' independence, which goes beyond corporate governance regulation and takes into account the context of family firms. It allows for cross-country comparability, which is crucial for this paper.
Importantly, we also revisit the 71 nonfamily CEOs who succeed the incumbent family CEO by applying the same criteria as above, except for criteria (2) and (6). We cannot apply criterion (6) as this would result in 45 nonfamily CEO successors, i.e. 63%, being classified as family-related
CEOs. Further, considering CEOs that have been former employees of the firm as being dependent on the firm would also bias against certain industries and firms, in particular those where industry-or firm-specific training is important. In other words, there are industries where it is crucial that the CEO has moved through the ranks and knows the firm's processes and technologies inside out before being considered for the post of CEO. We also decide not to apply criterion (2) for the following reason. While it seems justified to assume that an independent director is unlikely to be fully independent after serving nine years on the board, it is less clear why such a threshold makes sense for CEOs. Indeed, one can think of some industries where product development takes such a long time that CEOs (or senior management successors) need to stay in place to ensure commercial success. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry it typically takes ten years from the discovery of a new drug to the first sales. In other words, while in some industries a CEO, who has been in place for a couple of years, may know the firm inside out in other industries this may not be enough time for the CEO to have set his/her mark on the firm. Finally, none of the four criteria is met by the nonfamily CEOs. Hence, the nonfamily CEOs are very likely unrelated to the controlling family.
Next, we focus on the remaining independent variables, i.e. family power, family generation, shareholder protection and past firm performance. We use three different measures of family power: family control, family ownership and family wedge. First, family control is measured as the votes held directly by the family plus any additional votes resulting from indirect or pyramidal ownership (measured by the weakest link in the chain of control 9 ) expressed as a percentage of total votes outstanding. Second, family ownership is defined as the number of shares of all classes held by the family as a percentage of total shares outstanding. The numerator includes all shares held by family members (including co-trustees of the family). Finally, family wedge is the difference between the control rights and the cash-flow rights held by the family. It measures the family's incentives to extract private benefits of control from their firm.
Family generation measures the generation of the family CEO relative to the generation of the founder. It is a dummy variable that equals one if the departing CEO is the founder of the company or of the founder's generation, and zero otherwise. Shareholder protection equals one, if the firm is cross-listed on a US or UK stock exchange, and zero otherwise. As this dummy variable measures the improvement in shareholder protection via cross-listing on a US or UK stock exchange, it is equal to zero for the UK firms. Our two measures of past performance are return on equity and cumulative abnormal returns. Return on equity is defined as earnings after interest and tax divided by total equity, i.e. the sum of the book values of common equity and preferred equity (if applicable). It is based on the year before the succession. 10 In what follows,
we refer to year t as the year of the succession and to year t-1 as the year before the succession.
As an alternative, we employ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for various event windows.
The CARs are based on monthly data for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factor model, where month 0 is the month of the succession announcement. 11 The parameters of the four factor model are estimated over months -37 to -13.
We control for firm size, assets growth, industry-adjusted market-to-book value, interest coverage, long-term debt to (total) equity, dividend payout ratio and competition within the firm's industry. Assets growth measures the growth of assets in the year prior to succession and is calculated as the difference in total assets between year t-1 and year t-2 divided by total assets in year t-2. Industry-adjusted market-to-book value is defined as the market value of the ordinary and preferred equity divided by their book values minus the market-to-book value for the same industry and country.
12
Interest coverage determines the firm's ability to generate enough earnings to pay interest on its outstanding debt. It is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the interest coverage ratio, calculated as earnings before interest and tax divided by interest expense, is greater than two, and zero otherwise. 13 We also use long-term debt to equity. Higher assets growth and industry-adjusted market-to-book value 14 are proxies for firm growth. It is likely that the higher the assets growth and industry-adjusted market-to-book value, the higher is the likelihood that the new CEO will be a member of the controlling family. In contrast, the lower interest coverage, the lower the dividend payout ratio and the lower leverage, the less likely it is that the new CEO will be part of the controlling family. Greater debt as well as dividend and interest payments should mitigate the free cash-flow problem (Jensen, 1986) and hence reduce the private benefits the controlling family can extract from the firm. The Herfindahl index is used as a measure of competition in the firm's industry; it is the firm's market share in the industry. The lower the Herfindahl index, the greater is the competition in the market, making it less likely for a family CEO to be appointed as greater competition is likely to reduce the potential for the 11 For this purpose we used the European factors as available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 12 The industry classification is based on the Fama and French 10 industries classification. 13 Interest coverage of less than two is typically a sign that the firm faces severe financial needs and/ or financial constraints (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001 ). 14 In a previous version of the paper, we used the raw market-to-book value. The results were qualitatively the same.
extraction of private benefits of control. 15 Finally, some of the regressions also control for incumbent CEO characteristics, i.e. tenure and age. 16 Tenure is defined as the number of years the incumbent CEO has served as CEO in the firm. Age represents the age of the incumbent CEO at the announcement of the succession decision.
To test the validity of our five hypotheses about the likelihood of a family member becoming the CEO successor or the incumbent being re-appointed, we estimate the following logistic model:
where t is the year of the CEO succession for firm i. One-year lagged levels are used for the to UK firms. Interestingly, for all three countries most successions are family-to-family.
Results
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Nevertheless, there are differences across the three countries. In particular, for France more than 17 The reason why the least number of successions is observed for 2001 is mainly due to limited data availability before 2002 in Thomson One Banker. This is despite our efforts to supplement the data collection using various sources of information (see details in the sample selection section). The loss of firm data is driven by France and Germany. The corporate governance codes of these two countries are more recent than those of the UK, and the level of detail disclosed in the annual reports in terms of ownership and control data improved significantly after 2001, and hence data availability in Thomson One Banker. 18 Eighty-two percent of these firms (190 firms) have encountered only one succession during the period of study. However, one firm has five successions, another firm has four successions, six have three successions, and 33 have two successions during the period of study (results not tabulated). 19 In addition to the 25% control threshold, our definition of family firms is based on the family status of the CEO. Most high-tech firms start as a family firm (where family firms are defined in the same way as in this paper) where the founder has majority control. Our sample includes 78 business equipment firms. For 72 of these firms the incumbent CEO is the founder and the average firm age is less than 20 years.
80% of successions are family-to-family whereas for both Germany and the UK the equivalent percentage is only roughly 68%.
INSERT CEO age is about 56 years, with a median age of 57 years. Sixty-two percent of incumbent CEOs are the firm's founders (not tabulated).
As to the three measures of family power, Panel B suggests average family control is 60.71% and exceeds average family ownership of 54.93%, resulting in a mean family wedge of 5.63%. The average percentage of directors independent of the controlling family is 24.01%, with a median of 25%, a maximum of 77.79% and a minimum of 0%. These descriptives are much lower than those for conventional, i.e. reported, directors' independence. Indeed, the average percentage of directors that are independent in the conventional sense is much higher with about 55%. Hence, while the average firm reports a majority of independent directors on its board, when one adjusts for links with the controlling family this percentage drops to about 24%. Thirty-two of the sample firms are in the first generation and only 11% are cross-listed in the USA or the UK. Finally, the average return on equity for the year preceding the succession is 3.17%, with a median of 9.06%.
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE Table IV compares family-to-family successions with family-to-nonfamily successions. There are significant differences between the two succession groups in terms of firm and CEO characteristics (Panel A) as well as the hypothesized determinants (Panel B). Specifically, the results presented in Panel A indicate that firms in the family-to-family group have a significantly lower market value (the mean, not the median) and significantly lower total assets (both the mean and median). Panel B suggests that the family-to-nonfamily group is more likely to be in the second or later family generation, reflecting the fact that these firms are significantly older than firms in the family-to-family group (results not tabulated). This suggests that older firms are more willing to adopt a professional management approach. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups in terms of conventionally defined board independence. However, there is such a difference (at the 1% level of significance) when we consider our own measure of directors' independence, i.e. independence from the controlling family. In other words, family-to-family successions are more likely in firms with a lower percentage of directors that are independent of the controlling family. As expected, we find significantly greater protection of shareholders (at the 5% level) for the family-to-nonfamily group. Overall, the univariate tests of differences in means and medians support Hypothesis 2 (generation), Hypothesis 3 (directors' independence) and Hypothesis 4 (shareholder protection).
Contrary to our expectations, there are no significant differences in terms of any of the three measures of family power as well as for any of the two measures of past performance between the family-to-family and family-to-nonfamily groups. Hence, the univariate tests fail to support Hypothesis 1 (family power) and Hypothesis 5 (past performance).
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE
Since the above univariate tests in Table IV do not control for country differences, we divide the sample according to country and check for differences across the three countries in the five hypothesized determinants in Table V . Due to space constraints, the table reports only those variables with significant differences at the 5% level or better across the three countries. As expected, we find significant differences in control and ownership between the three countries.
Panel A on the family-to-family successions suggests that France has the highest average level of control (67%), followed by Germany (56%), and then the UK (49%). A similar pattern is observed in Panel B on family-to-nonfamily successions. These results are consistent with previous country studies such as Barca and Becht (2001) .
Concerning conventional board independence, Panel A for family-to-family successions suggests that the UK has the lowest proportion of independent directors on paper. Panel B shows that for the case of family-to-nonfamily successions both France and the UK have a lower proportion than Germany. Different patterns emerge when directors' independence from the controlling family is considered. Panel A on family-to-family successions shows that the (average and median) board independence from the controlling family is significantly lower in France than in both Germany and the UK. However, this is the case only for family-to-family successions as the respective differences are insignificant in Panel B. Overall, Tables IV and V suggest that there are significant differences between the family-to-family and family-to-nonfamily groups and that the firm's country also matters. Hence, in the multivariate analysis we also interact the country dummies with the hypothesized determinants to explore country differences in these determinants.
INSERT Regressions (1), (2) and (3) measure performance by the return on equity for year t-1 whereas regressions (4), (5) and (6) 21 The robustness of the results is also verified using dummy variables for the 20 th bottom and top percentiles of performance as measured by the return on equity for year t-1 and CAR [-12;-1] . We also test the results using return on equity for year t-2 and different event windows, i.e. CAR [-12;-1] , CAR [-18;-1] and CAR [-6;-1] . This additional analysis leads to similar results. These regressions are not reported in the paper, but are available upon request. 22 These regression results are available upon request from the authors. Table VI shows that the coefficient on family wedge is not significant in any of the six regressions, suggesting that family power does not impact the likelihood of a family successor.
INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE
Similarly, neither of the two alternative measures of family power, i.e. family ownership and family control, influence the likelihood of a family member replacing the incumbent family CEO (again, these results are not tabulated due to space constraints). Similar to the univariate analysis, there is no support for Hypothesis 1.
23 This is in line with Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) . Family generation also has no significant impact on the likelihood of the appointment of a family CEO in all six regressions. This finding does not support previous evidence that the generations of the family that succeed the founder tend to utilize a more professional form of senior management and that therefore the likelihood of appointing a family member drops with an increase in the family generation (see e.g., Dyer, 1988; and McConaughy and Phillips, 1999) . Hence, there is no support for Hypothesis 2.
Interestingly, conventional board independence is not significant in the two regressions (regressions (1) and (4)) that include this variable. In contrast, the percentage of directors independent from the controlling family is significant at the 1% level and is negative. The marginal effect of directors' independence in regression (2) suggests that, if the percentage of directors independent from the controlling family increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood of appointing a family CEO decreases by 17.6%, holding all other explanatory variables constant. Similarly, the reduction in board independence is significant and positive, suggesting that directors that are not independent from the controlling family are likely to vote with the latter when it comes to succession decisions. This confirms Hypothesis 3. Increased minority shareholder rights via a UK or US cross-listing has a significantly negative impact (at 23 The lack of support for Hypothesis 1 may be due to the fact that using a threshold of 25% for family control may cause variations in family control to have a marginal effect on the choice of successor. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us about this possibility. Apart from interest coverage in regression (5), none of the other firm characteristics is significant in any of the regressions. As to CEO age, this variable is significant in the first three regressions.
In terms of the country effects, there is some evidence that French and German family firms are more likely to appoint a family member as compared to UK firms. We perform a more thorough analysis of these country effects on the CEO successor choice in the next section.
To sum up Table VI , there is strong support for Hypothesis 3 as a family CEO is less likely appointed when directors' independence from the controlling family is greater. In contrast, conventional board independence does not have an impact. There is also support for Hypothesis 4 that greater minority shareholder protection via a US or UK cross-listing reduces the likelihood of a family member being appointed. However, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 (family power), Hypothesis 2 (family generation) and Hypothesis 5 (past performance). Overall, the results support the conclusions drawn from the univariate analysis. There is also some evidence that a family CEO is more likely appointed in the French and German firms than in the UK firms.
Country differences
This section extends the analysis of the country effects in Tables V and VI Table VII contains the interaction terms for only one country to avoid multicollinearity. In detail, regressions (1), (2) and (3) contain the interaction terms for France, regressions (4), (5) and (6) contain the interaction terms for Germany and regressions (7), (8) and (9) contain the interaction terms for the UK. As shareholder protection is a variable equal to one, if the firm is cross-listed on a US or UK stock exchange, and zero otherwise, the interaction between shareholder protection and the UK country dummy is omitted from regressions (7), (8) and (9). Also, most of the UK firms in the sample (85%) have a family wedge equal to zero (i.e.
family control is equal to family ownership). As a result, there is not enough variability in the interaction term between family wedge and the UK country dummy (97% of the observations are equal to zero). Hence, this interaction term is dropped from regressions (7), (8) and (9). As per (2) and (3) show that shareholder protection is not significant, but the interaction of the latter with the French country dummy is negative and significant at the 10% level. In regressions (4), (5) and (6), the coefficient on the equivalent interaction for the German firms is significant and positive while shareholder protection is also significant, of a similar absolute value, but negative. The marginal effects reported in regressions (1) to (3) suggest that French firms listed on a US or UK stock exchange are between 28 and 44% less likely to appoint a family CEO compared to firms not listed on these exchanges. Interestingly, this likelihood is much lower (up to 8%) for German firms in regressions (4) to (6). This suggests that for the French firms, and less so for the German firms, a US or UK cross-listing reduces the likelihood of a family member being appointed. This is in line with La Porta et al. 's (1997, 1998 ) characterization of French law providing the weakest shareholder protection.
Robustness analysis
Alternative estimation technique
The regressions in Tables VI and VII are binomial logit regressions, whose dependent variable is set to one if the CEO successor is a member of the controlling family and zero otherwise.
However, as a large number of our sample consists of re-appointments, i.e. 168 out of 283 succession decisions (see Table I ), it makes sense to verify the robustness of the results using a more granular classification for the dependent variable. We now classify the successions into three groups, namely group one being re-appointments (i.e. no change in the incumbent CEO); group two being CEO changes from one family member to another one; and, finally group three being CEO changes from a family member to a person not related to the family.
As the groups are in no particular order of preference, we use unordered multinomial logits to test the robustness of the results. We run the equivalent regressions to those in Regressions (1), (2) and (3) compare the odds of a new family CEO being appointed to the odds of the incumbent family CEO being re-appointed whereas regressions (4), (5) and (6) compare the odds of the appointment of a nonfamily CEO to the odds of the incumbent family CEO being reappointed. Finally, for regressions (7), (8) and (9) the base case is the appointment of a new family CEO; these regressions compare the odds of a nonfamily CEO being appointed to the odds of a new family CEO being appointed.
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Similar to Table VI , there is little evidence that family power matters. Hence, there is still no support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, family generation still does not matter. Also in support of our previous results, directors' independence from the controlling family is negative and significant at the 1% level in regression (2) and positive and significant at the 1% level in regression (5). The reduction in directors' independence in regression (6) is also significant, and negative as expected. These results provide further support for Hypothesis 3. In detail, regressions (5) and (6) suggest that it is more likely for a nonfamily CEO to be appointed than for the incumbent CEO to be re-appointed when directors' independence is high. In addition, re-appointment of the incumbent is more likely than the appointment of another family member. As per Hypothesis 3, regressions (8) and (9) suggest that it is also more likely that a nonfamily CEO is appointed than another family member when directors' independence from the controlling family is high. Hence, there is further support for Hypothesis 3. As previously found, conventional directors' independence has no effect. There is also further support for Hypothesis 4 about shareholder protection. Firms with a US or UK cross-listing are more likely to appoint a nonfamily CEO rather than a family CEO (see regressions (7)- (9)). Finally, there is still no support for Hypothesis 5 as performance is not significant.
INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE
The reasons for CEO departures
Studies on the impact of past firm performance on CEO appointments have also investigated the link between the type of CEO successor and the reason for succession. For instance, Puffer and Weintrop (1995) argue that neither corporate performance nor the composition of the board of directors explains successor type when the succession is caused by the voluntary retirement of the incumbent CEO. They also suggest that the personal relationship between the retiring CEO and the designated successor may take precedence over organizational performance considerations.
Nevertheless, they conclude that, when the incumbent CEO is forced to leave, past performance is likely to be the key determinant of the choice of successor. However in practice, it is rare that firms announce the departure of a family CEO as a forced departure. Often, euphemistic terms are used to mask the dismissal of a family member or no reason is stated (Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog, 2000) . Past studies have used different proxies for forced dismissal, such as the age of the incumbent CEO and the absence of a reason given for the departure (e.g. Hillier and
McColgan, 2009). We follow the same approach. Table I shows that, out of the 26 forced departures, 4 are family-to-family successions and 22 are family-to-nonfamily successions. We run a multinomial logit with the dependent variable equalling one if the CEO is re-appointed, two if there is a forced departure (regardless of whether the new CEO is a family member or not) and three for other successions. Regressions (10)- (12) in Table VIII present the results. Given the small number of forced departures, these regressions do not include the CEO and firm characteristics.
Family generation matters when we compare forced departures to re-appointments: all three regressions suggest that firms that are no longer in the first family generation are more likely to force the incumbent CEO to leave. Interestingly, we also find that directors' independence from the controlling family is significant at the 5% level (see regression (11)). This suggests that it is more likely for the family CEO to be forced to leave than to be re-appointed when directors' independence is high. Hence, there is further support for Hypothesis 3. However, shareholder protection does not have an impact on forced departures. Regression (11) suggests that it is less likely that the incumbent CEO is forced to leave than re-appointed when past performance is weak. However, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level only and we do not find any such effect when performance is measured by the CARs.
Actual changes in the CEO
While our sample includes re-appointments of the incumbent family CEO, existing studies on CEO successions typically exclude such observations. When we exclude re-appointments (see Table IX ), our existing results are upheld. Indeed, greater board independence from the controlling family as well as a UK or US cross-listing reduces the likelihood of the successor being a family member.
INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE
Conclusion
This paper analyses the determinants of the CEO succession decision in family controlled firms with family CEOs in France, Germany and the UK. The five hypothesized determinants of the succession decision are family power, family generation, directors' independence, shareholder protection and past performance. The main contribution of our paper is to propose a more accurate measure of directors' independence, which contrary to regulation and 'best practice' accounts for links with the controlling family. When we use our measure, we find strong support for the hypothesis that directors' independence reduces both the likelihood of the incumbent CEO being re-appointed and the likelihood of a family member being appointed as the new CEO.
Further, directors' independence increases the likelihood of a nonfamily CEO being appointed and the likelihood of the incumbent CEO being forced to leave. However, there are no such effects for conventional, i.e. reported board independence. This suggests that conventionally defined board independence is biased and is not an accurate measure of board strength and quality. This result has important policy implications for regulators and best practice in corporate governance.
Finally, there is also evidence that French firms with a US or UK cross-listing are less likely to replace the incumbent family CEO with another family member. This is further confirmation of the bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999) whereby firms opt into a better corporate governance system via a cross-listing to bond themselves against expropriating their minority shareholders. Table IV Comparison of the characteristics of the 212 family-to-family and 71 family-tononfamily successions
This table reports the mean and median comparisons for the 212 family-to-family and 71 family-tononfamily successions for France, Germany and the UK. All the variables are defined as in Table A . Differences in means are assessed using a t-test whereas differences in medians are tested using a z-test (Mann-Whitney U). § indicates that the variable is a dummy variable and the difference in this case is tested using a binomial test. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test). Table V Cross-country differences in succession characteristics
This table presents the mean and median comparisons across the three countries  France, Germany and the UK. Panel A reports the results for the family-to-family successions, whereas Panel B reports the results for the family-tononfamily successions. The table only reports descriptive statistics for variables with significant differences between countries, i.e. family wedge, family control, family ownership and directors' independence from the controlling family. All the variables are measured one year prior to the succession year. Differences in means are assessed using a t-test whereas differences in medians are tested using a z-test (Mann-Whitney U). All the differences are tested at the 5% level of significance and the superscript represents the number of the country with which a given country has a significant difference in means/ medians. For example, there is a significant difference at the 5% level in the means of the percentage of family wedge between country 1 (France) on the one side and country 2 (Germany) and country 3 (UK) on the other side, which is shown in the row "Family wedge, %" under country 1 as 8. France (1) Germany (2) UK ( 
Table VI Logit regressions of the determinants of the choice of the CEO successor
This table reports the results of the logistic regressions for the hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor choice and the control variables. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which is one, if the new CEO is a member of the controlling family (including a re-appointment of the incumbent family CEO), and zero otherwise. The hypothesized determinants are family wedge, family generation, directors' independence from the controlling family, shareholder protection, and past performance (as measured by the return on equity (regressions 1-3) and cumulative abnormal returns (regressions (4)- (6)). In regressions (1) and (4) we measure board independence using the conventional directors' independence whereas regressions (2) and (5), (3) and (6) include independence from the controlling family and the reduction in directors' independence, respectively. Year t is the year of the succession announcement. The cumulative abnormal returns CAR [-12,-1] are based on monthly data for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factor model, where month 0 is the month of the succession announcement. The parameters of the four factor model are estimated from month -37 to month -13. All six regressions include the hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor choice and in addition control for both firm-specific and CEO specific characteristics, i.e., assets growth over the last year, industry-adjusted market-to-book value, long-term debt to equity, interest coverage, dividend payout, Herfindahl index, firm size, and CEO age. CEO tenure is not included in the regressions due to multicollinearity problems. ME stands for marginal effects. All variables are as defined in Table A 
Table VII Logit regressions of the determinants of the choice of the CEO successor with country effects
This table reports the logistic regression results for the hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor choice interacted with the country dummies. It highlights potential country differences as to the impact of the hypothesized determinants on the choice of the successor. We also control for firm and CEO characteristics. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which is one, if the new CEO is a member of the controlling family, and zero otherwise. The hypothesized determinants are family wedge, family generation, directors' independence, shareholder protection, and past performance, as measured by return on equity. Directors' independence is measured using conventional directors' independence, independence from the controlling family and reduction in directors' independence. Regressions (1)- (3) contain the interaction terms for France whereas regressions (4)-(6) contain the interaction terms for Germany. Finally, regressions (7)- (9) are the equivalent regressions for the UK. For each of these three groups of regressions, the first one includes the conventional measure of board independence whereas the second and third ones include independence from the controlling family and the reduction in directors' independence, respectively. As shareholder protection is a variable equal to one, if the firm is listed on a US or UK stock exchange in addition to its home exchange, and zero otherwise, the interaction between shareholder protection and the UK country dummy is omitted from regressions (7)- (9). Also, the interaction between family power and the UK dummy variable is not included in regressions (7)- (9) as this variable is equal to zero for 85 of the observations. CEO tenure is not included in the regressions due to multicollinearity problems. ME stands for marginal effects. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are corrected for firm-level clustering. Figures in bold denote significance at the 10% level or better (two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Table VIII Robustness analysis − Multinomial logits
This table reports the multinomial logistic regressions for the hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor choice and control variables using a more granular classification of the dependent variable. In detail, the dependent variable in regressions (1)- (9) is a categorical variable which is one, if the CEO is re-appointed, two if there is a change in CEO and the new CEO is a family member, and three if there is such a change and the new CEO is not related to the controlling family. The dependent variable in regressions (10)- (12) is a categorical variable which is one if the CEO is re-appointed, two if there is a forced departure, regardless of whether the new CEO is a family member or a nonfamily individual, and three for other departures. All successions that did not result in a re-appointment of the incumbent CEO are considered forced departures with the exclusion of natural departures and cases of CEO becoming a chairman or moving to a supervisory board. Details are provided in Table I . We compare successions when there is a change in CEO with re-appointments (the base case) in regressions (1)-(6). We also compare changes in CEO from family-to-nonfamily to changes in CEO from family-to-family (the base case) in regressions (7), (8) and (9). Regressions (10)-(12) compare forced departures with re-appointments (the base case) for both family-to-family and family-to-nonfamily successions. The hypothesized determinants are family wedge, family generation, directors' independence, shareholder protection, and return on equity. Although not reported below, there is an intercept and we also control for firm and CEO characteristics, except in regressions (10)- (12), where they are excluded due to multicollinearity issues. There are 168 re-appointments in the sample, 44 successions where there is a change in CEO and the new CEO is a family member and 71 successions where the new CEO is not related to the controlling family. Also, in regressions (10)- (12) This table is similar to Table VI , but the sample excludes the re-appointments of the incumbent CEO. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which is one, if the new CEO is a member of the controlling family and zero otherwise. The hypothesized determinants are family wedge, family generation, directors' independence, shareholder protection, and past performance (as measured by the return on equity (regressions (1)- (6)) and cumulative abnormal returns (regressions (7)- (12)). Directors' independence is measured using the conventional directors' independence, independence from the controlling family and the reduction in directors' independence. Family generation and shareholder protection are included in separate regressions because of multicollinearity problems. Family generation is included in regressions (1)- (3) and (7)- (9) whereas shareholder protection is included in regressions (4)- (6) and (10)- (12). Year t is the year of the succession announcement. The cumulative abnormal returns CAR [-12,-1] are based on monthly data for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factor model, where month 0 is the month of the succession announcement. The parameters of the four factor model are estimated over months -37 to -13. All twelve regressions include the hypothesized determinants of the CEO successor choice. In addition (these are not reported for the sake of brevity), they include an intercept, country dummies for France and Germany and some firm-specific and CEO specific characteristics, i.e., assets growth over the last year, industry-adjusted market-to-book value, long-term debt to equity and CEO age. Interest coverage, dividend payout, the Herfindahl index, firm size and CEO tenure are excluded from the regressions due to multicollinearity problems. All variables are as defined in Table A Family wedge Excess of family control over family ownership in year t-1. This variable captures the difference between the control rights and the cash flow rights and measures the family's incentives to extract private benefits of control from their firm, at the expense of the minority shareholders.
Family generation
Generation of the incumbent family CEO relative to the generation of the founder, i.e. the first generation. It is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the second or a higher generation in year t-1, and zero otherwise. (Source: annual reports)
Conventional
directors' independence
The number of directors that are reported as being independent in the annual reports. For Germany, board size is the sum of the size of the management board and the size of the supervisory board minus the number of employee representatives. (Source: annual reports)
Directors' independence from the controlling family
The number of directors that are independent from the controlling family as percentage of board size. A director is classified as being independent vis-à-vis the controlling family if she/ he does not meet any of the following six criteria:
(1) the director is related by blood or marriage to the controlling family; (2) the director has a tenure of at least nine years with the firm; (3) the director is an employee or a director of another firm controlled by the same family; (4) the director was appointed to the board by the controlling family; (5) the director sits on other boards together with the family directors; and (6) the director is a former employee of the firm. (Source: annual reports, IPO prospectuses, Thomson One Banker)
Reduction in directors' independence
The difference between directors' independence from the controlling family and conventional directors' independence
Shareholder protection
A dummy variable that equals one, if the firm is listed on a US or UK stock exchange, in addition to its home exchange in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
